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 Radiological contamination from nuclear accidents or the terrorist use of a 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) are mass casualty events that first responders and 
medical personnel must be prepared for.  During a radiological attack, large numbers of 
victims will need to be quickly decontaminated. It is currently assumed that removal of 
the victims’ clothing will remove 80-90% of contamination.  What is often not 
considered is the threat of re-aerosolization of radiological contamination from the 
victims’ clothing during removal and disposal.  Many of the radioisotopes ideally suited 
for use in an RDD would produce dense aerosols that would then contaminate victims.  In 
order to better understand the re-aerosolization of contamination, a series of experiments 
were conducted.  In these experiments, clothing was contaminated with a dense aerosol 
selected to simulate a commonly available radioisotope of Strontium 90.  The 
contaminated clothing was shaken for several minutes next to an Institute of 
Occupational Medicine inhalable sampler (IOM) to simulate the clothing removal process 
while the IOM captured any inhalable re-aerosolized particles.  When compared to 
background trials, there was a statistically significant amount of re-aerosolization from 
the clothing.  This result demonstrates the inhalation hazard from the re-aerosolization of 
dense radioactive particles on clothing during the decontamination process. Precautions 
to protect the health of victims, first responders, and medical personnel should be taken to 
mitigate the re-aerosolization threat.  
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RE-AEROSOLIZATION OF DENSE METAL OXIDE SIMULATING 
RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION FROM MILITARY CLOTHING 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Radiation is a threat to human health.  Getting radioactive particles on or inside of 
the body is especially hazardous following the accidental or intentional release of 
radioactive contamination.  Real world events such as the nuclear accidents at Chernobyl 
and Fukushima released radioactive particles that then contaminated large areas. This 
radioactive contamination covered the bodies and clothes of people who were within 
these areas, and it was inhaled it into their lungs.  When inhaled into the body, 
radioactive particles can cause long term negative health effects such as cancer.   
 Terrorists have sought to exploit the damaging effects of radioactive 
contamination by attempting to build devices that intentionally spread radioactive 
particles in order to cause casualties and make contaminated areas unlivable. A 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) is a weapon designed for this purpose. One 
iteration of an RDD is known as a “dirty bomb” uses an explosion to disperse radioactive 
material and cause contamination. The general public’s lack of understanding of radiation 
compounds the terror effect that would be produced by the use of an RDD.  There has yet 
to be a successful attack using an RDD, but such an attack is high on the list of priorities 
for terrorist organizations and only second to acquiring nuclear weapons capable of 
producing a nuclear explosion (Mowatt-Larssen 2010).   
 Mitigating radiological contamination and its health effects on humans is critical 
to responding to an RDD attack.  The US militaries’ Multi-Service Tactics, Technique, 
and Procedures manual on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 
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Consequence Management Operations states that “Emergency decontamination is a 
process that removes contamination from personnel in order to save lives, minimize 
casualties, and limit the spread of the contamination”.  It also advises that the first step in 
the decontamination process should be victim clothing removal regardless of the 
suspected CBRN agent used (2015).  Clothing removal is a vital step in the 
decontamination process; the US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center Special 
Report on mass casualty decontamination (ECBC-SP-024) estimates that removing 
clothing can eliminate 80-90% of contamination (2009).   
 A major concern is the transport of removable radiological contamination on the 
victims’ clothing during and after its removal.  The materials that are likely to be used in 
an RDD would produce a dense aerosol that would contaminate victims and their 
clothing.  During the clothing removal process, the re-aerosolization of radioactive 
particles from the clothing poses an inhalation hazard for anyone involved in the 
decontamination process including the victims, the first responders, and the medical 
personnel working the decontamination line.   
 The body of research on the re-aerosolization of particles from clothing is 
somewhat limited and what is available focuses on low density particles such as silicon.  
The re-aerosolization of dense particles from clothing has not been well investigated.   
This research is to investigate the inhalation hazard of dense radioactive particles 
re-aerosolized from contaminated clothing.  The objective of this research is to determine 
if a significant number of particles can be re-aerosolized from clothing contaminated with 
a dense aerosol and if the re-aerosolized particles constitute an inhalation hazard.   
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To answer these questions, an aerosol test chamber was used.  A mannequin 
dressed in clothing was placed inside the aerosol test chamber and contaminated with 
particles selected to simulate the radioactive contamination that would be produced by an 
RDD.  Copper oxide was selected as a simulant because it is a relatively dense and can be 
acquired cheaply in the required particle size range.  
For the treatment trials, the mannequin’s clothing was contaminated with the 
copper oxide aerosol inside the test chamber.  After contamination, the chamber was 
cleaned to remove any contamination not on the clothing.  The contaminated clothing 
was then removed from the mannequin and shaken from outside the aerosol test chamber 
using a series of pulleys and string.  The clothing was shaken to simulate the forces that 
would be experienced during the clothing removal step of decontamination.  The number 
and size of particles re-aerosolized from the clothing was then measured using an Optical 
Particle Counter (OPC) and an Institute of Occupational Medicine inhalable sampler 
(IOM).  The IOM is designed to capture the inhalable range of particles and can be used 
to effectively measure the number of particles that an average person would inhale. 
For the background trials, a clean uniform was shaken inside a clean test chamber.  
The OPC and IOM were used to record any aerosols produced in the chamber.  This 
would give a background count for particles such as lint produced from the uniform.  
Also, any copper oxide particles missed during the cleaning process would be observed 
and could be subtracted out.  A statistically significant difference between the treatment 
trials and the background trials would show that particles are being re-aerosolized from 
the clothing.   
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The implication of this research is that it will establish what kind of threat is 
posed by the re-aerosolization of radioactive particles from contaminated clothing.  
Improved decontamination procedures can be designed that better protect victims and 
first responders.   
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 II. Literature Review 
 
Radiological contamination presents unique challenges for remediation. It can 
come from a variety of sources, either from an accidental release or an intentional 
attack. In this work, the focus will be on intentional contamination using a Radiological 
Dispersal Device (RDD), colloquially known as a “dirty bomb”.    
 An RDD is a device that is designed to spread radioactive contamination over an 
area (“NRC: Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs” 2007). It does not necessarily have to use 
explosive force to disperse the radioactive material and could be constructed without the 
use of any explosives. A sprayer system mounted on an airplane and used to disperse 
radioactive material would also meet the definition of an RDD. Also, powdered 
radioactive material could be placed in the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning 
(HVAC) system of a building for dispersal. However, the most likely scenario for the use 
of an RDD involves the use of explosives. The usual design of an RDD is to place a 
suitable radioactive material on top of an explosive device and detonate it (“Radiological 
Attack Fact Sheet” 2015) so that the force of the explosion would then scatter the 
radioactive materials over a wide area.    
 An RDD is not a nuclear bomb. A nuclear bomb uses nuclear fission and/or 
fusion to produce an explosive yield. Although a nuclear bomb does produce nuclear 
contamination in the form of nuclear fallout, that is not the main goal. An RDD is the 
“poor man’s nuke” and does not produce a nuclear yield or blast. The goal of the RDD is 
to spread contamination.   
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 The threats from an RDD are the blast from the explosion, the radiological 
hazard, and the fear and panic caused by the attack (Ford 1998).  An RDD is not 
generally considered a weapon of mass destruction but rather a weapon of mass 
disruption (Rickert 2005). Attacking the urban core of a major city with an RDD would 
cause major economic disruption and the displacement of a large population, but the 
number of people killed by the RDD would likely be low. The real effects are the fear 
generated and the residents’ reluctance to return to the contaminated area. A backpack 
containing explosives and 185 Tera-Becquerels (TBq) (or 4.47 grams) of ground cobalt-
60 (Co-60) metal would expose a victim to 0.12 Sieverts (Sv) at the point of detonation 
(Ford 1998). Although this level of exposure would be above the recommended yearly 
dose of 0.05 Sv for a radiation worker, it would not be fatal (“NRC: Information for 
Radiation Workers” 2019). In effect, an RDD is an area denial weapon.  
A becquerel is the number of nucleus decays in a given amount of material per 
second.  One becquerel is equivalent to one decay per second. The sievert is a 
measurement of the health effects of ionizing radian on the human body. The sievert 
converts the different types of ionizing radian, measured in grays, to an equivalent impact 
on the human body.  This is done by multiplying the dose by a quality factor based on the 
different types of radiation.  For example, the same dose in grays of alpha radian would 
have a much greater human health impact than an equivalent dose of gamma radiation.  A 
gray is a measurement of absorbed radiation (dose) and is defined as one joule of 
radiation energy absorbed per kilogram of matter.  
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 Because RDD’s are designed to spread radioactive contamination, their 
effectiveness is directly dependent on what radioactive material is used and how much is 
dispersed. There are several threat isotopes that are of interest in building an RDD. These 
isotopes are listed in Table 1 as well as the commonly available chemical forms and 
uses. In addition, the densities of the chemical forms are listed in the table.  The density 
of a material is one of the factors that determines how long a particle will remain 
suspended as an aerosol and how likely it is to re-aerosolized from a surface.  Denser 
aerosols will deposit faster than lighter particles and are less likely to aerosolize.   
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Table 1 - This table shows some of the most common radionucleotides that 
could be used in an RDD  (Andersson et al. 2008).  
 
   
 Radiation is electromagnetic energy and particles that are released when 
radioactive isotopes decay.  Each type of isotope decays in a specific way.  Ionizing 
radiation is of great concern because it has high enough energy to decouple electrons 
from atoms and cause a negative impact on the human body.  Ionizing radiation can 
disrupt the structure of DNA inside cells and lead to cancer. There are four main types of 
ionizing radiation: alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron.  Alpha particles can only travel a 
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few inches in air and are stopped by the human skin.  Beta particles can travel several feet 
in air and can be stopped by something as thin as aluminum foil.  Gama radiation will 
only be stopped by thick, dense materials like several inches of lead.  Neutron radiation is 
even more penetrating and requires the use of very thick shielding or low atomic number 
materials such as water (Colella et al. 2005).    
The radiation hazard from the gamma rays produced from the material used in an 
RDD is more dangerous to the perpetrators before detonation than to victims after the 
attack  (Luckey 2003). Radioactive sources can give off significant amounts of gamma 
radiation and thus the RDD will need to be shielded in order to protect the perpetrators 
from receiving high doses of radiation. Alternatively, the perpetrators of the attack could 
forgo the use of shielding if they are unconcerned with surviving the attack. The hazard 
to the victims of the attack is higher from the alpha and beta radiation given off by the 
material. Once dispersed, the effects of gamma radiation are much reduced and the threat 
becomes contamination with radioactive particles inside the body(Luckey 2003). 
 Radiological contamination poses the greatest risk to humans when it is absorbed 
into the body where it can kill cells and damage DNA. Radiation exposure can cause 
Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS) if high enough doses are received. Typically, a whole 
body dose of 0.7 Sv received in a relatively short time will cause ARS (“CDC Radiation 
Emergencies | Acute Radiation Syndrome: A Fact Sheet for Physicians” 
2019). Symptoms can include weakness, vomiting, and death. If a lower dose of radiation 
is received, it may not cause ARS but will still damage the DNA of cells and could 
manifest later in life as cancer.  
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 There is a distinct difference between radiation and radioactive 
contamination.  Radioactive materials give off radiation which has a negative effect on 
the human body.  A person standing near a radioactive source will receive a dose of 
radiation.  However, as they move away, the dose received will begin to reduce. When 
dealing with radiation, the principles of time, distance, and shielding reduce the risks of 
radiation exposure.   
• Time:  We want to reduce the amount of time exposed to radiation and keep the 
amount of radiation received to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA).  
• Distance: We want to increase the distance from the radiation source.  
• Shielding: If unable to use distance, then we want to shield ourselves from the 
radiation source using materials such as lead that will stop the radiation.   
Radioactive contamination is what happens when radioactive material is spread 
around the environment in the form of small particles. The danger of radioactive 
contamination is that it is easily spread from environmental sources to tools and 
people. Alpha and beta emitting isotopes are relatively benign when outside the 
body.  However, if small radioactive particles are inhaled or ingested, then that same 
alpha and beta radiation is extremely harmful. Once inside, it takes the body a long time 
to remove these isotopes, thus extending the exposure time.  
The danger posed by radioactive particles differs based on their size and what part 
of the body they are infiltrating. These areas can be divided into gastrointestinal, dermal 
and pulmonary. Particles of any size can be ingested. Particles greater than 10 μm cannot 
penetrate the skin but smaller particles can work their way into the hair follicles, and 
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particles under 3 μm can diffuse through the stratum corneum and make their way into 
the blood (Shekunov et al. 2007). One of the most damaging areas for a particle to reach 
is the alveolar region deep in the lung, although only particles less than 10 μm can reach 
this area (Hinds 1999).  Small particles under 10 μm are the most concerning to human 
health.  
The International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) is an 
international organization that has developed models for how radiation is absorbed by the 
body.  The ICRP model divides the respiratory system into three main areas: Head 
Airways, Tracheal Bronchial, and Alveolar.  The head airways include the nose and 
mouth areas, the tracheal bronchial area includes the airway from the head areas down to 
the lungs and the major airway branches in the upper lung, and the alveolar region is 
deeper within the lung and includes the area where the gas exchange occurs.  When 
engaged in  light exercise while nose breathing at 30 L/min, the average adult will have 
80% of inhaled 5 micron particles and 95% of 10 micron particles trapped in the nose 
(Hinds 1999).  Figure 11.3 in the Hinds text shows that the vast majority of particles 
deposited in the tracheal bronchial region and alveolar region are under 10 microns.  It 
also shows that particles over 10 microns represent a relatively small percentage of 
respirable particles and that most large particles are trapped in the head and nose region. 
It should be noted that the head airways capture the vast majority of particles over 10 
microns while smaller particles are able to penetrate into the alveolar region.  
Radioactive material deposited in the respiratory system is cleared by the body in 
several different ways.  Particles caught in the head airways and nose can be cleared by 
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sneezing or nose blowing.  Particles caught in the throat and tracheal bronchial regions 
are cleared by the mucus conveyor.  The upper respiratory system is coated in mucus and 
inhaled particles are captured by this mucus.  Tiny cilia hairs in the respiratory system are 
continually moving mucus to the back of the throat where it is swallowed.  Radioactive 
particle that are swallowed then go on to impact the gastro intestinal tract.  Particles that 
make their way to the alveolar region are absorbed by the blood and can be transported to 
the lymph nodes (Individual Monitoring for Internal Exposure of Workers: Replacement 
of ICRP Publ. 54 ; Adopted by the Commission in May 1997 1998).  The effects of 
radionucleotides in the body differ, depending on the radionucleotide.  For example, Sr 
90 follows a similar biological course to that of calcium.  Strontium is treated by the body 
as if it were calcium and is absorbed into the bones where it can cause bone cancer.  
Some radionucleotides are more easily excreted in urine or solid waste.  
The ICPR recommends that radiation workers limit their internal exposure to 20 
mSv per year or 100 mSv in a 5-year period; their internal body dose from inhaled and 
ingested radioactive material should not exceed these limits.   The Annual Limit on 
Intake (ALI) for any one radionucleotide can be determined using the following equation:  
 







The e(50) for inhaled Sr 90 is 3.0x10-8 Sv Bq-1.  So, Sr 90 has an Annual Limit on 
Intake of 6.6x105 Bq.   





Equation 3.  
N(atoms)  ×  λ(𝑠𝑠−1) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
 
 
The half-life of Sr 90 is 28.8 years.  Using Equation 2, the decay constant is found 
to be 7.63x10-10 s-1.  Strontium has 6.022×1023 atoms/mol.  We can then calculate that 
strontium has 4.59x1014 Bq/mol using Equation 3.  Strontium has 87.62 g/mol so we can 
calculate that Sr 90 has 5.243x1012 Bq/g.  This means that the Annual Limit on Intake for 
Sr 90 is 1.26x10-7 g or 0.126 micrograms.  The density of Sr 90 is 2.63 g/cm3.  From this 
we can calculate the number of particles needing to be inhaled in order to reach the 
maximum annual dose.  In order to reach the ALI for Sr 90, a person would only need to 
inhale 11,438 particles that were 1 micron in diameter or 12 particles that were 10 
microns in diameter. This is a conservative calculation because it is unlikely that 
someone would be inhaling pure Sr 90.  A person is much more likely to be exposed to a 
compound of Sr 90.  This would increase the amount that could be inhaled before 
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reaching the Annual Limit on Intake.  In order to make that calculation, the activity level 
of that compound of Strontium would need to be known.   
Mitigating radiological contamination and its health effects on humans is critical 
to responding to an RDD attack.  The goal of decontamination is to remove the damaging 
agent from the victim’s skin and hair, protect first responders and medical personnel from 
secondary exposure, and to prevent the victims from spreading contamination to other 
areas.  The US militaries’ Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures manual on 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Consequence Management 
Operations advises that the first step in the decontamination process should be victim 
clothing removal regardless of the suspected CBRN agent used (Combs et al. 2015).  The 
US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center Special report on mass casualty 
decontamination (ECBC-SP-024) estimates that removing clothing can removes 80-90% 
of contamination (“U.S. ARMY EDGEWOOD CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL CENTER 
SPECIAL REPORT ECBC-SP-024” 2009).  Clothing removal is a vital step in the 
decontamination process that removes the vast majority of contamination.  
 A decontamination line for a mass casualty CBRN event is designed to quickly 
decontaminate a large number of people.  In a CBRN attack, the area of greatest 
contamination is designated as the hot zone.  Immediately outside of the hot zone is the 
warm zone, and areas free from contamination are designated as the cold zone.  The 
decontamination line should be set up within the warm zone just outside of the area of 
contamination.  In the United States in the aftermath of a CBRN attack, the immediate 
decontamination of victims would most likely be conducted by Hazardous Material 
(HAZMAT) teams from the local fire department.   In the early stages of a CBRN attack, 
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it is unlikely that first responders will know exactly what kind of agent was used.  For 
this reason, decontamination procedures are the same for all CBRN agents.  Victims 
leaving the hot zone would be directed to the decontamination line where the first step is 
to remove clothing.  The best advice is to remove all clothing.  When removing clothing, 
shirts should be unbuttoned rather than pulled over the head so that contamination from 
the clothing does not get on the face or inhaled. If a garment must come off over the 
head, then it should be cut off or the victim should place their arms and hands inside the 
garment and push it away from the face as it comes off over the head.  If people refuse to 
remove all clothing, they should at least remove all outer clothing because this will 
contain the majority of contamination.  Leaving on underwear is a decent compromise 
between decontamination and modesty.  If time and resources allow, victims should be 
provided with plastic bags and markers so that they can place their clothing and personal 
items inside the bags and label them for later identification and retrieval.  The next step 
of the process is to wash the victims with high volumes of low-pressure water at 60 psi.  
The easiest method is to use the hoses from fire trucks.  Two fire trucks can be parked 
parallel to each other about 20 feet apart to create a decontamination corridor.  The hoses 
from the trucks are then directed into this corridor so that the victims can walk through it.  
It is recommended that the victims be deluged with water for 30 seconds to 3 minutes, 
depending on the scale of the attack and the number of victims.  Each side of the victim 
should be directly sprayed to get off the most contamination. Soap and water are not 
necessary unless the agent is oily and cannot be removed with water alone.  In the case of 
an oily agent, victims who still have some of the agent left on their skin after the initial 
water deluge should be taken for secondary decontamination using soap and water.  The 
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area selected for the decontamination line should be up hill from the hot zone so that the 
contaminated water from washing victims will flow into the hot zone and not 
contaminate new areas. After the victims have been through the water deluge, they 
should be directed to a holding area where they can be monitored for further symptoms.  
Victims that are physically injured or experiencing symptoms from the agent should be 
taken to a hospital where additional decontamination and treatment can occur. In cold 
weather where decontamination is occurring outdoors, it could be hazardous to the 
victims’ health to wet them.  In this case, the victims should remove clothing, and any 
contamination should be blotted away with an absorbent material.  Victims should then 
be moved into a warm area (“U.S. ARMY EDGEWOOD CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL 
CENTER SPECIAL REPORT ECBC-SP-024” 2009).  
The first responders running the decontamination line should be in protective 
gear.  For a fire department HAZMAT team, this should take the form of their Self-
Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and firefighting gear.  An SCBA is a mask 
connected to a back-worn compressed air tank.  However, other types of respiratory 
protection could be used such as a Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR) that runs air 
through a filter before blowing it into a mask system.  In a military context, the Joint 
Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) system can be used.  The 
JSLIST consists of an activated carbon impregnated suit with rubber gloves and boots 
and an M50 gas mask.  The M50 gas mask uses a High Efficiency Particulate Air 
(HEPA) filter to remove 99.9% of 0.3 micron particles in conjunction with activated 
carbon to filter out CBRN agents (Barrett, n.d.).       
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During the 1986 Chernobyl disasters, massive amounts of radiological 
contamination were released into the atmosphere when a Soviet nuclear reactor in the 
Ukraine suffered a catastrophic explosion and subsequently released significant amounts 
of Cs 137.  The Chernobyl accident released 0.089x1018 becquerels of cesium and 
1.8x1018 becquerels of radioactive iodine.  During the cleanup of Chernobyl, 600,000 
people worked within the exclusion zone around the reactor.  The workers in this area 
received an average dose of 0.11 Sv; 1.4% of workers received up to 0.25 Sv.  It should 
be noted that the occupational limit for radiation workers in the United States is 0.05 Sv 
per year (“Radiation, How Much Is Considered Safe for Humans?” 1994).  Immediately 
following the reactor explosion, 134 plant workers and fire fighters received doses over 
0.7 Sv; of these, 28 people died (Ingram 2005).   The clothing worn by the fire fighters 
was so highly contaminated that it was dumped in the basement of the hospital where 
they were treated.  The hospital and the surrounding town were later abandoned due to 
contamination. Scientists entering the hospital’s basement 27 years later in 2013 recorded 
radiation levels as high as 16 mSv per hour (Bevelacqua 2016).   
 In the former Soviet Union, Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG’s) 
containing 1000 - 10,000 TBq of strontium-90 were used to power equipment such as 
light houses and beacons in remote places (Andersson et al. 2008). An RTG uses the 
decay of radioactive material to produce electricity. Many of these RTG’s are 
unaccounted for and could easily be used in an RDD attack.  It is estimated by Lawrence 
Livermore National Labs that the Soviets produced and installed approximately 1000 
RTG’s. Since 2003, a joint effort between the U.S. and Russia has replaced many of the 
old RTG’s with solar and wind powered generators and removed the RTG’s to secure 
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locations for disposal.  However, at least 20 of the Soviet RTG’s remain in the field and 
several are unaccounted for (Porter 2014).   The type of chemical composition of the 
strontium in these RTG is in the form of a ceramic, strontium titanate (SrTiO3).  
In 2001, wood cutters in the country of Georgia discovered two canisters 
containing strontium-90 from an old Soviet era RTG.  The wood cutters retrieved the 
canisters and used them as a heat source during the night.  They soon became sick from 
the radiation exposure.  When removed from their protective containers, the strontium 
sources could emit enough radiation to deliver a fatal dose in two minutes (Schmid and 
Spencer-Smith 2012).   
It is difficult to determine the exact size range of particles from an RDD incident 
but it appears to be dependent on the form of the material. It has been shown that in an 
attack using solid cobalt-60 metal, very little of the material would be aerosolized by the 
explosion. However, milling cobalt-60 into a fine powder would greatly increase the 
amount that is aerosolized in an explosion. In ceramic and salt forms of radiological 
materials, explosive dispersal can produce larger particles in the range of 30-100 μm and 
smaller particles in the 1-10 μm range (Harper, Musolino, and Wente 2007). 
 Metals tend to break apart into larger pieces when distributed explosively. More 
brittle materials like ceramics tend to shatter along grain lines and produce smaller 
particles in the 1-50 μm range (Green et al. 2016). In an RDD, the larger particles settle 
faster and are not likely to spread beyond the immediate vicinity of the blast (Andersson 
et al. 2008).  Particles that are less than 10 μm are the most likely to stay aerosolized and 
impact a much wider area.     
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In 1961, the Canadian Department of National Defense conducted a series of 
experiments in which glass microspheres were released from a tower to show the 
potential for drift. The microspheres ranged in size from 50-100 μm and were released 15 
meters above a flat prairie. The experiments were conducted on days with an average 
wind speed of 5 m/s. It was found that all of the particles fell out of suspension within 
300 meters of the tower (Hage 1961). Particles smaller than the ones used in this 
experiment are likely to stay airborne much longer.    
In 1968, a B-52 carrying nuclear weapons crashed in Greenland. The 
conventional explosives in the nuclear weapons exploded but due to the extremely safe 
nature of nuclear weapons design, there was no nuclear yield. Essentially, the nuclear 
warheads detonated in a manner similar to an RDD. It was found that 98.7% of the 
contamination was under 18 μm in size. Plutonium spontaneously oxidizes to plutonium 
oxide PuO2 in the atmosphere.  Plutonium oxide is a ceramic with a density of 11.5 
g/cm3.  When the bomb detonated the plutonium in the nuclear bomb would have quickly 
oxidized into a ceramic material and could account for the relatively small particle sizes 
observed (McMahon et al. 2000).   
It is clear that smaller particles are the greatest threat from an RDD, but it should 
be noted that the heat and force of an explosion can also fuse particles together (Harper, 
Musolino, and Wente 2007). The Canadian Ministry of Defense conducted several full 
scale RDD tests using radioactive material in a device that used 200 grams of explosives 
and 12 grams of lanthanμm-140. Based on their small-scale testing, the powdered form of 
lanthanum oxide (La2O2) was chosen. The median diameter of the particles used in this 
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experiment was 25 μm before the explosion and 45 μm afterward.  It was assumed that 
the increase in particle size was due to particles fusing together under the force of the 
explotion (Green et al. 2016). It is important to note that in a particle distribution, there is 
a wide range of particle sizes that are above and below the mass mean diameter. As we 
have seen, large particles will be deposited close to the explosive site while the smaller 
end of the distribution is more likely to contaminate a large area.   
In order for a particle that has been deposited on a surface to be re-aerosolized, 
the lift force on the particle must exceed the forces of attraction. As diameter increases, 
the amount of surface area for air currents to act on increases. At the same time, 
increasing mass causes the gravitational force keeping a particle on a surface to increase 
as well (Hinds 1999). There is a point where increasing surface area counteracts the 
increasing mass of a particle and makes it more likely to re-aerosolize. The number of 
particles that are re-suspended from clothing is dependent on their size. In a study by 
McDonagh (2014), silica particles ranging in size from 3-10 μm were deposited on 
clothing and a test subject performed various physical activities. The number of particles 
that aerosolized from the clothing was measured, and it was found that particles in the 10 
μm size range were more likely to re-aerosolize than larger particles. In studies of the re-
aerosolization of household dust, it has been found that in the size range of 0.3-25, the 
potential for re-aerosolization increases with particle size. However, the trend reverses 
for particles above 25 μm (Thatcher and Layton 1995). Particles under 10 μm are the 
most likely to re-aerosolize from clothing and they are also the size range of particles that 
would be most widely distributed over an area by a well-designed RDD. 
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 There have been two examples of viable RDD’s that were deployed by a terrorist 
group but not detonated. In the 1990’s, Chechnyan rebels fighting for independence from 
Russia placed an RDD containing 13 kg of cesiμm-137 in a park in Moscow (Ford 
1998).  Later, another RDD was found on a railroad line where an unidentified 
radioactive material had been placed on top of a landmine (Colella et al. 2005).  It is 
unknown how effective these devices would have been if they had functioned as 
designed.   
 In 1987, there was an accidental release of cesiμm-137 in Goiania, Brazil. 
Although this release was accidental, the circumstances of the release illustrate the 
hazards of an intentional RDD attack. Several metal scavengers removed a sealed 
container of cesium chloride salt from a radiotherapy unit in an abandoned hospital (Lage 
et al. 2020). Eventually they were able to open the sealed container and brought it home 
to show their families. Large areas of the town were contaminated with cesium; 249 
people were identified as being contaminated, 20 required hospitalization/treatment, and 
4 people died (Stone 2007).  The most heavily contaminated buildings were demolished 
and the topsoil removed in an effort to decontaminate them. This radiological accident 
shows the dangers of readily available medical sources. An intentional attack could be 
much worse.   
 The current body of knowledge does a good job of describing the threats posed by 
RDD’s.  The threat isotopes that are most likely to be used in an RDD are well cataloged.  
Also, much research has been conducted by the Canadian Ministry of Defense and The 
Lance Livermore National Laboratory to describe the partial ranges that an RDD is likely 
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to produce.  Research in the area of re-aerosolization has been conducted and there have 
even been studies examining the re-aerosolization from clothing.  However, this research 
has focused on unit weight particles (the density of water) and has not explored the re-
aerosolization of dense particles from clothing and the inhalation risk those particles 
pose.   
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III.  Methodology 
 
This research examined the potential for the re-aerosolization of radioactive 
contamination from clothing. This contamination was simulated with non-radioactive 
dense particles used as a simulant.  The procedure was to first contaminate clothing with 
a dense aerosol (copper oxide).  The clothing was then shaken to simulate removal and 
disposal of the clothing in a medical decontamination setting.  The number of particles 
that were re-aerosolized from the clothing were measured using various instruments.    
 An aerosol test chamber was used for the testing.  The chamber was 0.914 m × 
0.914 m × 6.401 m (3 ft × 3 ft × 21 ft) and made of plexiglass.  A 93 cm × 118 cm access 
door was located in the center of the chamber’s side.   A High Efficiency Particulate Air 
(HEPA) filter was positioned at each end of the chamber for the air supply entering the 
chamber and at the exhaust for the removal of particles.  The HEPA filter removes 
99.97% of particles that are 0.3 microns and higher percentages of particles that are larger 
and smaller than 0.3 microns (US EPA 2019).   HEPA filtered air was then drawn 
through the chamber by a fan.  The air flow through the chamber was 0.762 m/s and was 
measured using a Lab Safety Supply model 193996-00 vaneometer.  A rotating brush 
generator (RBG) was used to aerosolize the copper oxide powder.   
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Figure 1- Aerosol Test Chamber. 
 
 The copper oxide used for this experiment was Black Copper Oxide (CuO) made 
by Alpha Chemicals.  99.9% of the copper oxide passes through a 325 mesh (44 μm size 
holes). The d50 is 625 mesh (20 μm size) (Hinds 1999).  Copper oxide has a density of 
6.315 g/cm3 at 25° C.  The copper oxide was selected because of its density and safety 
characteristics.  As discussed in the literature review, the radionucleotide strontium 90 
has a commonly available oxide in the chemical form of strontium titanate (SrTiO3). The 
density of strontium titanate is 5.11 g/ cm3, similar to the density of the copper oxide, 
although the copper oxide is a little denser than strontium titanate.  Using a slightly 
denser material than strontium titanate for aerosol testing will produce slightly more 
conservative results because denser particles will settle out faster and are less likely to re-
aerosolize (Hinds 1999).  The size range of the copper oxide is consistent with the 
particle size ideal for an RDD.  The sources in the literature review identified the particle 
size range created by an RDD to be in the 1-50 μm with the most widely dispersed 
particles be in the 1-10 μm range.  The particle size distribution of the chosen copper 
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oxide meets the size range of particles expected from an RDD.   Finally, the copper oxide 
was chosen due to availability and affordable price.   
The copper oxide aerosol from the RBG was injected into the chamber using a 
small diameter copper tube.  The tube extended into the center of the chamber and had a 
90-degree bend at the end in order to inject the copper oxide aerosol into the air stream as 
it flowed through the chamber.  The tube injected the aerosol into the wind in order to 
create a more uniform distribution of aerosol in the chamber.   
A Simulaids Rescue Randy® adult mannequin was laid in the chamber “wearing” 
an Airman Battle Uniform (ABU).  To facilitate the removal of the uniform, the 
mannequin was not fully inside the uniform.  The uniform was placed on top of the 
mannequin so that the legs of the pants were laying directly on top of the mannequin’s 
legs (see figure 1).  The uniform blouse was draped over the torso and the sleeves were 
laid on top of the mannequin’s arms.  The uniform was covering the mannequin in an 
anatomically correct way as it lay in the chamber.  Fifteen-pound test polyethylene 
braided fishing line was attached to the uniform and run through a pulley located 15.24 
cm from the top of the chamber.  The fishing line was tied through the top button hole on 
the uniform pants fly and the top button hole on the uniform blouse.  The other end of the 
line went through a small hole in the side of the chamber so that it could be pulled from 
outside the chamber.  The pulley system allowed the uniform to be lifted off of the 
mannequin and shaken (see figure 3).   
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Figure 5 - ABU uniform suspended from the pulley.  The uniform was pulled 
to the top of the pulley as shown and dropped from this height onto the chamber 
floor.  This process was repeated for 5 minutes.   
 
 
ABU’s were selected for use in this research for several reasons.  The research 
was commissioned by the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) to study Chemical 
Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) decontamination.  Due to the military 
connection and because this research is focused on decontamination of military 
personnel, a military uniform was selected.  ABU’s were also a convenient choice 
because the Air Force was at the time transitioning from the ABU to a new uniform, the 
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Operational Camouflage Pattern (OCP).  This left a large supply of old uniforms that 
could be recycled for research purposes.  The ABU uniform is similar in construction to 
the OCP, and both are a 50/50 nylon-cotton blend (Wharton 2017).  The ABU uniform is 
also a close approximation to what a typically dressed civilian might wear.  Civilian work 
pants and a long-sleeved shirt are of similar construction.  
For each trial, the mannequin was placed in the chamber wearing a clean uniform.  
After the chamber was closed, the chamber fan was started; finally, the RBG was turned 
on.  Each trial used 4.01 cubic centimeters of copper oxide dust loaded into the RBG. The 
RBG used was a Palas RBG 1000 solid particle dispenser.   
 During contamination, the particulate levels inside the chamber were monitored 
using two optical particle counters (OPC) and an Institute of Occupational Medicine 
inhalable sampler (IOM).  The OPC’s used were a Particles Plus Model 8306 and a 
Particles Plus Model 8506 (Particles Plus, Stoughton, MA).  The bin sizes were set to 
0.3-0.5, 0.5-1, 1-2.5, 2.5-5, 5-10 and 10-25 μm for the Model 8306.  The bins for the 
Model 8506 were set to 0.5-1, 1-2.5, 2.5-5, 5-10, 10-15 and 15-30 μm. The data was 
recorded as total particle counts for a 5 minute period. 
It should be noted that the OPC’s used the index of refraction of particles to 
measure their size.  Every material has a different index of refraction and an OPC would 
need to be calibrated to that index of refraction in order to have an accurate measurement.  
In this case, the OPC’s were unable to have their index of refraction adjusted to that of 
copper oxide.  The factory default index of refraction for these OPC’s is that of water, so 
that the measurements taken from the OPC’s are not the exact size of the particles 
present.  However, the measurements are internally consistent with themselves.  The 
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OPC data should be seen as a relative measure and not an absolute measure and was 
primarily used to get a real time measurement of relative number of particles in the 
chamber and to ensure that the RBG was properly dispensing particles.   
The IOM was selected because it is designed to capture the amount of particles 
that a typical human would breathe in.  This research is concerned with the danger that 
re-aerosolized radioactive particles from a victim’s clothing would pose to a medical 
professional providing care.  Radioactive particles that are inhaled also present a hazard 
to the contaminated individual by significantly increasing the chances of lung and bone 
cancer (Todorov and Ilieva 2004).  Radioactive particles that decay through the release of 
alpha and beta particles pose little threat outside of the body.  Alpha particles can only 
travel a few inches in air while beta particles can travel several feet in air (Hodnett 1961). 
However, if radioactive particles enter the body through inhalation or ingestion, they can 
cause great harm.  The IOM is designed so that when it is operation at a flow rate of 2 
L/min, it will capture the inhalable fraction of particles (Hinds 1999). An IOM is 
typically worn on the lapel in the breathing zone of a worker exposed to an aerosol 
hazard (Zhou and Cheng 2009).  After exposure, the IOM filter is then weighed or 
examined using microscopy to determine the worker’s aerosol exposure.  In this 
experiment, the IOM was placed in close proximity to the contaminated ABU’s while 
they were being shaken.  The IOM captured the inhalable fraction of the re-aerosolized 
contamination that a medical worker would be exposed to while working closely with a 
contaminated patient. 
The RBG brush was set to spin at 1200 rpm, the piston was set to rise at a rate of 
120 mm per minute while it was fed with 2.4 psi air.  It took approximately 25 minutes 
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for the RBG to dispense the copper oxide powder before shutting off.  To account for 
variability, the IOM was allowed to collect a sample for 30 minutes at 2 lpm sampling 
flow rate.  The OPCs were placed next to each other on the floor of the chamber using the 
included wire stand and even with the IOM.  The IOM was suspended in the center of the 
chamber 1 meter downwind from the mannequin's feet and 0.66 meter from the pulley.   
The RBG dispensed dust into the chamber for 25 minutes.  The chamber fans 
were allowed to run for 30 minutes to allow any dust remaining in the air to settle.  After 
the RBG stopped dispensing dust, the OPC counts in the chamber would typically fall to 
background levels within a minute.  Waiting 5 minutes between the RBG shut off and 
turning off the chamber fans ensured that any remaining dust contamination in the 
chamber could settle out. 
The fan and RBG were shut off 30 minutes after the start of the contamination.  
The chamber was then carefully cleaned: the chamber floor that was reachable through 
the open door was HEPA vacuumed, then the chamber floor, walls, and ceiling were 
wiped down with a long-handled disposable dust mop (Swiffer™ brand Swiffer mop and 
Swiffer brand mop pads).  All of the equipment inside the chamber was wiped down with 
a paper towel wetted with ethyl alcohol.  The mannequin’s exposed face, hands, and feet 
were also wiped down with paper towels and ethyl alcohol. All visual contamination was 
removed from the chamber, while great care was taken to not disturb the mannequin or 
the uniform.  After cleaning, the chamber was allowed to dry for 5 min. The IOM was 
replaced with a new one and a 30-minute background sample taken.  During the 
background sampling, the chamber fan was left off.   
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After taking the background sample, the chamber was opened and the IOM was 
again replaced.  The chamber was then resealed and the uniform was shaken for five 
minutes continuously.  The chamber fans were again left off.  The uniform was hoisted to 
the top of the chamber by the pulley system and allowed to fall to the chamber floor.  
After the uniform hit the floor it was again pulled back to the top of the chamber and 
released.  This was done to simulate expedient clothing removal during the 
decontamination process. The uniform was pulled upwards at a rate of 61 cm/s.  It took 
approximately 1 second for the uniform to be pulled from the chamber floor to the top of 
the pulley.  After five minutes of shaking, the uniform was left on the bottom of the 
chamber until the full 30-minute IOM sample had been taken.  The IOM collected a full 
30 minutes in order to maintain a consistent volume of air being pulled through the 
filters.  Also, this allowed any residual cloud of particles to be collected by the IOM.  
After collection, the IOM filters were sputter coated with 10 nm of gold using a 
Quorum Q150R Plus: Rotary Pumped Coater for Noble Metals Sputtering, then observed 
under a JEOL scanning electron microscope.  Six sites per filter were selected and 
observed at 1500 times magnification.  The microscope used was a JEOL JSM-IT500 
controlled using the JEOL Version 1.020 software package.   This magnification level 
was selected because it allowed the microscope to more efficiently perform Energy 
Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS).  The six sites were selected using a pattern 
determined during pilot runs.  Four equally spaced sites around the edges of the filter 
were selected.  Because the IOM filter holder covered the outer 2 mm of the filter during 
sample collection, the four sites used were 7 mm from the edge to avoid the area that was 
covered by the filter holder.  Two sites 2 mm on either side of the filter’s center were also 
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used, for a total of 6 sites.  The microscope provided a low magnification view of the 
filter; each site was selected before zooming in.  Once zoomed in to 1500 times 
magnification, the microscope operator did not move the field of view. The field of view 
for each site was 85.33 μm by 64.00 μm for a total area of 5461.12 square μm.      
An energy dispersion spectroscopy (EDS) was used on each site in order to 
confirm that the particles on the filters were in fact copper oxide and no other dust or 
clothing lint.  The EDS works by bombarding a target with X-rays.   When excited by the 
X-rays, each element will give off unique wave lengths of electromagnetic radiation.  The 
peaks of these emissions can be analyzed to determine what elements are present 
(Nasrazadani and Hassani 2016).  The Oxford Instruments X-ManN controlled with 
Aztec Version 3.3 software was used to perform the energy dispersion spectroscopy.  The 
number of particles per site were counted using the FIJI Image-J image processing 
software.  The average number of particles per site was calculated and recorded for each 
filter in a spreadsheet.   
The ABU uniforms used in the trials were cleaned between trials and reused.  The 
uniforms were first HEPA vacuumed, then washed using a residential washer and dryer.  
Five pairs of ABU pants and six ABU blouses were used in a continuous rotation so that 
no one set was used more than the others and the same pants were not paired with the 
same blouse. Washing the uniforms after every use removed loose uniform fibers and 
helped to ensured that the particles collected during the trials were the copper oxide 
contaminate and not uniform particles.   
     Seven background trials were conducted to ascertain the efficiency of the 
chamber cleaning methods.  In these trials, the mannequin was placed in the chamber in a 
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clean uniform and contaminated as it was in the normal trials.  However, when the 
chamber was cleaned, the contaminated uniform was removed from the mannequin and 
replaced with a clean one.  The trial then continued as normal.   The goal was to ensure 
that the contamination collected on the IOM was coming off the uniform and was not 
residual contamination left in the chamber that was being stirred up by the action of 
shaking the uniform.  Shaking a clean uniform in a completely clean chamber should 
produce an IOM filter with zero copper oxide particles on it.   It was noted in these 
background trials there were a few particles of copper oxide found on the filters.   This 
indicated that the chamber cleaning method used was not 100 percent effective.  
However, this could then be used as a point of comparison for the normal trial runs.        
A total of 18 trials were conducted.  The number of trials was determined by 
conducting a statistical power analysis (Faul et al. 2009) using the software G*Power 
Version 3.1.9.2.  The program was set to calculate the required sample size needed for an 
independent t-test given an alpha of 0.5, a power of 0.8, and a 2.035 effect size (Hunt 
2019).   The effect size was calculated using the G*Power software with data from six 
pilot trials.  The mean and standard deviation of the pilot studies were fed into the 
software to calculate the effect size.  The data from the pilot trials is shown in Appendix 
A and the output from the G*Power software can be seen in Appendix B.   
Pilot trials were conducted in order to determine the number of trials needed and 
used different methods than the final trials protocol.   A full uniform was not used during 
the pilot trials; only a blouse was placed in the chamber and connected to the pulley 
system so that it could be shaken. The chamber containing the blouse was contaminated 
with the copper oxide before the blouse was shaken in front of the IOM for 5 minutes.  
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The chamber was not cleaned between the time that the uniform was contaminated and 
when the shaking began.  Also, the chamber fan was kept running during the shaking 
process.  The protocol to clean the chamber after uniform contamination was not 
implemented until after the pilot trials that were used for the power analysis.   The data 
for the background pilot trials was also collected differently than the final protocol.  For 
the background trials, the chamber was contaminated with a uniform inside.  After the 
chamber and uniform were contaminated, the IOM samples were then collected while the 
chamber fans were running. The uniform was not shaken during the background samples 
and the chamber was not cleaned between trials.    
Additional pilot trials were also conducted to determine the viability of 
gravimetric analysis of the IOM filters instead of using microscopy.  These trials were 
conducted in the same way as the already discussed pilot trials.  However, instead of 
preforming microscopy to visually analyze the filters, the filters were weighed before and 
after each trial to determine if there was any change in weight.  The filters were weighed 
immediately before a trial and then again immediately afterward.  This was done to 
reduce the likelihood that any weight change observed in the filter was not due to 
moisture absorbance.  The filters were weighed using a XPR2 (Mettler Toledo, 
Columbus, OH), which is accurate down to the 0.001 mg.  It was discovered that there 
was not a detectable weight difference for the filters before and after the trial because the 
scale available was not sensitive enough to detect the weight of the copper oxide particles 
that were deposited on the filter.   
The G*Power software showed that 5 trials each would be needed for the 
background and treatment groups for a total of 10 trials.  It was decided to increase the 
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number of trials to 10 each.  This was done to ensure that there would be enough trials in 
case there were problems or if any trials were invalidated.  Due to time constraints, 10 








The results from this research are broken down into two groups.  The data from 
the IOM and the data from the OPC’s were analyzed separately.  The results of the study 
were analyzed using the software PASW statistics 18 release 18.0.0 (30 Jul 2009).  
 The number of particles counted per site for each of the IOM filters can be seen in 
Table 2. The number of particles per site for each filter was averaged.  The average 
number of particles per site was what was used in the analysis.   
Table 2 - IOM Filters Particle Counts 
Number of particles counted on the IOM filters for each of the six sites observed. 
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First, the IOM filter results were analyzed for normality, skewness, and kurtosis.  
Within the PASW software, the explore function under descriptive statistics was used to 
conduct a Shapiro-Wilk test. This was to determine if the data was normally distributed.  
It was determined that the background trial data was normally distributed but the 
treatment trial data was not normally distributed.   
Figure 6 - Electron microscope image of IOM filter at 1500 times 
magnification.  Particles of copper can be seen as irregular white areas on the filter.  
The small black circles are 0.8 micron holes in the filter.  
 
Using the PASW software, a box plot of the treatment data was constructed, 
which can be seen in Figure 6.  The software noted an outlier in the treatment data.  
Because the data for trial 7 was three standard deviations above the mean, trial 7 was 
eliminated from the data as an outlier.  The Shapiro-Wilk test was rerun on the new data 
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with an alpha value of 0.05.  The Shapiro-Wilk test showed that the data was now 
normally distributed.  The skewness and kurtosis of the data set was less than one.   
  
Figure 7 - Boxplot of IOM data.  Note the start indicating that trial 7 is an outlier. 
 
 The IOM filter data was found to be normally distributed after removing the 
outlier, so an independent t-test was performed.  The background trials had a mean of 
3.269 (95% confidence interval ± 1.929) and a standard deviation of 2.086.  The 
treatment trials had a mean of 10.364 (95% confidence interval ± 4.902) and a standard 
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deviation of 6.853.  The t-test showed that there was a statistically significant difference 
between the background group and the treatment group with a p-value of 0.010.   
 The results of the Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) analysis can be 
seen in Table 3.  Over 80% of the particles found on the treatment group IOM filters were 
identified as copper.  However, on the background trials’ IOM filters, the EDS only 
identified 41% of the particles as being copper.  It is to be expected that not all of the 
particles found on the IOM filter are copper. Clothing particles and other dust are also 
present.  Finding such a huge difference between the background trials and the treatment 
trials further strengthens the findings from the t-test.  The background trials contained 
less particles than the treatment trials and a lower percentage of the particles were copper.  
This further supports the finding that there is re-aerosolization of copper particles from 
the clothing.  
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Table 3 - IOM Filters EDS Elemental Analysis Results  
Results from the Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy analysis of the IOM filters.  
One site for each IOM filter was analyzed.   
 
The data collected from the IOM filters is in terms of particles per observed site.  
This is not a particularly meaningful or useful number.  The IOM filter data can be 
converted to an air concentration because the flow rate through the filter is known as well 
as how long the sample was taken.   The IOM pump was pulling 2 liters per minute and 
the samples were taken for 30 minutes.  Using the average values, it was determined that 
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there were 31,617,445,993 particles per cubic meter of air during the treatment trials.  
During the background trials, the concentration of particles in the air was 9,975,670,436 
particles per cubic meter of air.  
Table 4 - Change in OPC Bucket Counts  
This table shows the change in OPC bucket counts from before shaking the uniform 
subtracted from the OPC count after shaking. 
 
The OPC data that was collected was also analyzed.  The raw data can be seen in 
Appendix B.  The OPC readings from before the shaking and 3 minutes into shaking the 
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uniform was used in the analysis.  The readings from before shaking were subtracted 
from the readings taken 3 minutes in; the change for each bucket can be seen in Table 4.  
This data was then analyzed using the PASW statistics software.  Trials 2 and 4 were 
discarded because they contained outliers.  After removing trials 2 and 4, a Shapiro-Wilk 
test was conducted on the data.  It was found that the data for the 0.3-0.5, 0.5-1, 1-2.5 and 
2.5-5 micron buckets were normally distributed.  However, the data for the 5-10, 10-15 
and 15-30 micron buckets were not normal.  Due to this, the 0.3-0.5 through the 2.5-5 
micron buckets were analyzed using an independent t-test. It was found that there was a 
statistically significant difference between the treatment group and the background group.  















Table 5 - OPC Buckets Background vs Treatment with t-test Significance 
Difference in OPC buckets for background and treatment group means.  The table 
also shows the result of a t-test to determine if there was a difference in means 
between the background group and the treatment group. The counts for each 
bucket are total counts for a 5 minute period.  
 
 The 5, 10 and 15 micron buckets were found to not be normally distributed.  A 
log transform was used on the data but the data was not able to be made into a normal 
distribution.  This leaves non-parametric analysis.  The Mann–Whitney and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov non-parametric test is used to determine if there is a statistical difference in the 
median of two independent non-parametric data sets (Hart 2001).  The Mann–Whitney 
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were not able to show a statistically significant difference 
between the treatment group and the background group.  The result of this test can be 
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seen in Table 6. For the larger particle bucket sizes, there does not appear to be a 
statistically significant difference between the treatment group and the background group.   
 
Table 6 - OPC Buckets Background vs Treatment 
This table shows the mean for the OPC buckets that did not show significance using 
parametric testing.  The background and treatment means for each bucket and the 







V.  Discussion 
 
The results of this research indicate that there is a significant inhalation hazard 
created by the re-aerosolization of dense particles from clothing. The findings from the 
IOM samples show that the movement of contaminated clothing produces an aerosol that 
can be inhaled. The re-aerosolization of particles from the victims’ clothing presents a 
nontrivial hazard and the victims’ own movements continue to expose them to an 
inhalation hazard even after they have left the area of initial contamination. Medical 
personnel treating the victims of an RDD attack would also be exposed to an inhalation 
hazard from victims’ clothing. Victim decontamination should focus on removing 
clothing as soon as possible, and procedures should emphasize limiting the amount of 
movement that the clothing is subjected to and respiratory protection for personnel. 
Vigorous movement of contaminated clothing should be discouraged during removal and 
disposal in order to limit the exposure of the victim and the people working the 
decontamination line.  
 The data from the IOM shows that there was a significant number of particles re-
aerosolized from the clothing during the 5 minutes of shaking.  These results are 
significant because they correspond to the amount of material that a typical person would 
inhale. Although this research does not closely examine the health effects of inhaled 
radioactive particles and uses a dense aerosol as a surrogate, any amount of radioactive 
particles inhaled into the body is a health concern.    
There is a statistically significant difference between the number of particles of 
copper found on the IOM filter between the treatment group and the background group. 
48 
This confirms with a reasonable level of statistical significance that an aerosol is 
generated during clothing removal when contaminated with a dense aerosol. There was 
some copper found on the background IOM filter. In a perfect experiment, there would be 
no copper oxide on the IOM filter when a clean uniform is shaken in front of it. The fact 
that there was a small number of copper particles found on the background IOM is a 
reflection of the chamber cleaning procedures. The parts of the chamber that could be 
reached by the researcher were thoroughly cleaned during each trial. However, due to the 
design of the chamber, a low level of copper particles remained inside. The chamber was 
cleaned each time using the same procedures so any level of residual copper particles 
would remain consistent between trials. The EDS analysis preformed on the IOM filters 
showed that the vast majority of the particles (80%) found on the treatment filters were 
copper particles. The remaining particles were either too small for the EDS system to 
identify definitively as copper or they were dust and lint from the uniform.  There were 
less particles found on the background IOM filters and a much lower percentage (41%) of 
these were copper. This indicates that over half of the particles on the background IOM 
were lint/dust. In the results section for the IOM filter, no distinction was made for the 
difference between copper particles and dust/lint. The fact that there was a lower 
percentage of copper on the background filters provides additional evidence that there 
was a significant difference between the background trials and the treatment trials.  
The OPC data confirms the IOM data. There was a statistically significant 
difference found between the background trials and the treatment trials. However, the 
OPC data should be considered a relative measure and not an exact measure of particle 
size. An OPC uses the index of refraction of a particle to determine its size. Different 
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materials have different indexes of refraction. The OPC’s used were not able to be 
calibrated for copper oxide and so they were left at their factory default settings. This 
means that the measurements given by the OPC’s are not the actual particle sizes. 
However, they are accurate relative to themselves. The OPC data should be seen as a 
relative measure and not an absolute measure. The OPC data for the treatment trials show 
significantly more particles than the background trials for the 0.3 – 0.5 μm particle 
buckets. The OPC data for the 5 – 30 μm particle buckets did not show a significant 
difference between the background and treatment trials. This is consistent with the IOM 
data because the IOM captures respirable particles. While larger particles up to 100 
microns are respirable, the vast majority of those particles are less than 10 microns. If the 
aerosol being produced by shaking the uniform is a respiratory hazard, it would have 
many more smaller particles than larger ones. Although the OPC data does not show the 
exact size range, it does show that there is a significant increase in smaller particles when 
shaking the uniform.  
In the larger size ranges for the OPC, there is no statistically significant difference 
between the background and treatment groups. This is not necessarily cause for concern. 
Several factors likely contributed to this outcome. The copper oxide particles that were 
used each have a Mass Median Diameter (MMD) of 20 μm. Particles over 20 μm 
contribute 50% of the mass but they do not represent 50% of the particles present. Larger 
particles have more mass and so less are needed to reach the same mass as smaller 
particles. This means that the Count Median Diameter (CMD) is much lower than 20 μm. 
The CMD is the median based on the number of particles, not weight.   The geometric 
standard deviation (σg) of the copper particles used was not obtained. However, if we 
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assume a relatively average geometric standard deviation (σg) of 2, then the CMD can be 
calculated. Using equation 4.47 form Hinds, it is found that the CMD is 8 μm (Hinds 
1999). 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 exp�𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2σ𝑔𝑔� 
20 = 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 exp(3 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2(2)) 
20 = 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 exp(1.44 1) 
20�
1
1.441� = 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 7.996 
 
Larger particles are less likely to re-aerosolize in the first place. The lift force on 
the particle must exceed the force of gravity holding it down. Also, larger particles will 
settle out more quickly and would be less likely to be collected by the OPC.  
This research has identified that re-aerosolization of dense aerosols from clothing 
is a hazard. The OPC and IOM data shows that the particles that are re-aerosolized are 
small and within the respirable range; they are the ideal size to be deeply inhaled into the 
lungs. Because radioactive particles deep in the lung are the most damaging, the 
decontamination process should seek to minimize the number of particles that are re-
aerosolized. This means that clothing should be removed with a minimum of shaking and 
clothing should not be dropped or tossed into disposal containers. In order to mitigate the 
inhalation threat from re-aerosolization, the victim can put on a disposable N95 mask 
before the clothing removal step. This would be a quick and cheap way to minimize the 
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re-aerosolization threat. Also, if decontamination activities are occurring indoors or in a 
tent, the air should be HEPA filtered to remove any re-aerosolized contamination.  
In this research, the contaminated clothing was shaken vigorously for 5 minutes. 
This amount of shaking was selected to simulate a worst-case scenario and designed to 
simulate an expedient decontamination process seen during a mass casualty event or the 
removal of clothing from a critically injured patient. However, a real-world 
decontamination line situation may not allow for the gentle removal of a victim’s 
clothing.  
ABU uniforms were used in this experiment, as opposed to CBRN personal 
protective equipment, because in a real world RDD attack the victims would likely be 
caught unprepared and wearing everyday clothing. The open weave of uniforms and 
civilian cloths would act to trap small particles within the fabric and reduce the amount of 
small particles that are aerosolized.  Also, some fabrics are more prone to becoming 
electrically charged.  The static electricity produced by certain fabrics would keep 
particles stuck to the clothing.  Specially designed protective suits made of plastic or 
rubber material do not have fibers to trap particles and could have more particles re-
aerosolize from their surface.   
Further research should investigate techniques for expedient clothing removal that 
minimizes re-aerosolization. Wetting the victim’s clothing before removal would likely 
reduce the amount of re-aerosolization from the clothing by making the particles of 
contamination stick to each other as well as the clothing.  This is similar to the practice of 
spraying dirt roads with water to keep down dust.    The use of different clothing types 
should be tested to see what materials would minimize the re-aerosolization hazard from 
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protective gear.  This experiment could be rerun using Tyvek suits or JSLIST’s to 
determine the re-aerosolization risk from these materials.   
The methods developed during the course of this research can be applied to future 
aerosol investigations using the same test chamber.  The setup used in this research can 
easily be adapted to investigating the re-aerosolization properties of different types of 
particles. Other RDD threat materials like plutonium and uranium oxides are much 
denser the copper oxide used in this experiment.  Tungsten and Bismuth powders are 
cheap available and non-toxic. Their densities are 19.3 g/cm3 and 9.78 g/cm3 
respectively. 
The particle sizes used in for this experiment were selected based on the threat of 
a well-designed RDD using ideally sized particles.   In the RDD test conducted by the 
Canadian Ministry of Defense, the median particle diameter was under 25 microns which 
would represent a well-designed RDD. In a real-world RDD, an attacker is likely to use 
whatever radioactive material that is available so it is unlikely to be a sophisticated RDD 
design. The actual threat from a real-world RDD could be significantly less than a well-
designed RDD using finely ground particles. Radioactive material that is in large pieces 
would be less effectively dispersed by an explosion than a finely ground particulate.  
During the course of this research operational limits on the test chamber were 
observed. During the early pre-trial phase of this research, it was found that facing the 
RBG outlet downwind while the chamber fan was running did not produce any 
significant readings on the OPC or IOM. However, when the RBG outlet was faced into 
the wind, the OPC and IOM were able to detect copper particles. It was discovered that 
when the outlet faced down wind, the force of the airstream would carry the particles 
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through the chamber in a thin jet without dispersing them. When facing the RBG outlet 
into the airstream complete aerosol mixing was achieved within the chamber and ensured 
that the mannequin and clothing were thoroughly exposed to the copper oxide.   
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VI.  Conclusion 
 
The most significant finding of this research is that dense particles in the inhalable 
range can be re-aerosolized from clothing. This data was obtained using an IOM, which 
is designed to capture particles that the average person would inhale. A statistically 
significant difference was found between the uniforms that were contaminated and 
shaken next to the IOM and the clean uniforms shaken next to the IOM.   
The filters from the IOM were examined under an electron microscope to 
determine the number of particles that were present.  Also, Energy Dispersive X-Ray 
Spectroscopy (EDS) was used to confirm that the particles that were present were the 
copper oxide used to contaminate the uniform.  This allowed for the differentiation 
between the simulated radioactive contamination and lint/dust from the clothing.  
 The copper oxide used for this research most closely simulates strontium 90 
because they are of a similar density.  Also, the copper oxide is in the ideal particle size 
range for use in an RDD. Strontium 90 is a prime candidate for use in the construction of 
an RDD and there are significant unsecured sources from which terrorists could source 
material.   
Future research should look into using different techniques for minimizing the re-
aerosolization threat.  Future work can study the effects of wetting clothing before 
removal and the use of different clothing materials.  
When conducting decontamination operations for victims that have been exposed 
to radioactive contamination, there is a significant threat of re-aerosolizing the 
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contamination that is on the victims’ clothing.  Measures need to be taken to protect the 
victims, first responders, and medical personnel from this hazard.   
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Appendix A 
This table shows the results of the pilot trials conducted.  The data was then 
used to conduct a statistical power analysis to determine the number of trials needed 
for the experiment. 
Background Trial Number of Particles per site   
1 6     
1 4     
1 3          
1 7     
2 8     
2 3     
2 5     
2 6     
3 3     
3 5     
3 4     
3 7       
    mean 5.0833 
    SD 1.7298 
Treatment Trial  Number of Particles     
1 5     
1 20     
1 26     
1 16     
2 12     
2 16     
2 21     
2 35     
3 29     
3 12     
3 28     
3 6       
    mean 18.833 
      SD 9.3985 
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Appendix B 







   
0.3 – 0.5 Micron OPC Bucket 
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